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What the Private Sector Can Do 
to Corral Runaway CEO Pay
Franklin Strier
In 2008, three
prominent politicians each
proposed a separate
legislative measure to
stanch runaway CEO pay.
Then U.S. Senator Barack
Obama, U.S. Senator Hillary
Clinton and U.S. Senator
John McCain all proposed
bills requiring that
shareholders be given the
right to an advisory vote on
new executive pay packages.
Whether sincere efforts or
just campaign tactics, these
proposals by major
presidential hopefuls for a
legislative answer to
increasingly spectacular
CEO pay reflected mounting
public sentiment.
The Problem:
Runaway CEO Pay
The impetus for these
legislative initiatives is stark
and unambiguous. CEO
compensation at major U.S.
companies continues to
escalate unabated—in both
absolute and relative terms. 
An Embarrassment of
Riches
In 2005, average total
compensation for the CEOs
of 350 leading U.S.
corporations was $11.6
million, down slightly from
$11.8 million in 2004
(Lublin, 2006). To help
conceptualize the relative
size of CEO pay, a key
reference has been the ratio
of average CEO pay to
average worker pay. An
Institute for Policy Studies
report found that this ratio
rose from 42-to-1 in 1980 to
411-to-1 in 2006. While
smaller than the 2000 peak
of 525-to-1, it is nearly 10
times as large as the 1980
ratio (Institute for Policy
Studies and United for a
Fair Economy, 2006). 
What major U.S.
corporations pay their CEOs
is also out of kilter with
what is paid their counter-
parts at major European
corporations. American
executives continue to leave
European executives in the
compensation dust.
According to an Associated
Press survey, in 2006 the 20
highest–paid European
managers made only one-
third as much as the 20
highest–paid U.S. executives
(Institute for Policy Studies
and United for a Fair
Economy, 2007). In 2005,
the average U.S. CEO
earned 475 times the
average employee’s pay. In
the same year, the
multiplier was 11 in Japan,
15 in France, 20 in Canada,
and 22 in the UK (Herman-
son, 2006).
The popular appeal of
CEO pay reform may be due
in part to a perception that
the CEO/average worker
pay comparison is a micro-
cosm of growing wealth
inequality among Ameri-
cans. Data from 2005-2006
indicates that income
inequality is the highest it
has been since 1928. The
top 1/10 of 1percent (0.1%)
of Americans—300,000—
earn as much as the bottom
150 million combined, and
for every three-year period
since 1981, the same top
0.1% of American taxpayers
have gained, on average,
$100 billion in total
earnings, while the bottom
80 percent have lost $100
billion (Hindery, 2008). 
Even at companies
faltering badly, CEOs have
enjoyed extravagant
compensation packages.
According to the website of
the U.S. House of
Representatives Financial
Services Committee: 
Increasingly,
research indicates
that executive com-
pensation does not
appear tied to com-
pany performance.
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Others have noted
that in many
instances senior
executives appear to
be being “paid for
failure.” As this
Committee has seen
first hand, even
executives of
institutions that lose
money, restate
earnings, and face
extensive regulatory
scrutiny have
received (and
retained) substantial
compensation
packages (U. S.
House of
Representatives,
Financial Services
Committee, 2007).
Examples of high pay
despite performance
abound. Consider the
severance package of Angelo
Mozilo, former CEO of the
recently failed Countrywide
Financial Corporation—
considered by many the
poster child of the subprime
mortgage meltdown. Mozilo
was going to receive: a
$36.4 million cash
severance payment;
$400,000 per year for
consulting services; plus
perks that included the use
of a private airplane. He
walked away from most of
these after a public outcry,
but still left with at least
$23.8 million (Alazraki,
2008). Yet Mozilo’s
severance pay pales in
comparison with that of
former Merrill Lynch CEO
Stan O’Neal, who left in
2007 with a retirement
package worth more than
$160 million (Heisel, 2008)
after Merrill suffered the
biggest losses in its 93 years
(Thomas & Anderson, 2007).
While severance
payments might be
perceived as the cost of
buying out the contract of a
CEO whose corporation has
foundered, no such
justification exists for
exorbitantly rewarding
CEOs who stay on despite
poor corporate performance.
It would certainly not
explain why Ed Whitacre,
CEO of AT&T, made $34
million over the years 2004
and 2005 despite a 40 point
drop in the corporation’s
stock from 2001-2005
(Institute for Policy Studies
and the Center for
Corporate Policy, 2007).
Another stupefying
illustration of apparent pay
for failure was the
compensation of former
Home Depot CEO Robert
Nardelli. In 2006, he
accepted a pay package
valued at $250 million even
though his company’s stock
declined under his
stewardship (Kirkland and
Burke, 2006). And at Allied
Capital of the District, its
CEO, William Walton,
received $11 million in
2007, including a $5.3
million bonus, while its
stock lost one-third of its
value (Heath, 2008). These
and similar instances of
excessive CEO pay at
corporations performing
poorly led Warren Buffet to
observe: “Today, in the
executive suite, nothing
succeeds like failure” (2006:
16). 
This paper will first
briefly identify the untoward
consequences of excessive
CEO compensation. It will
then review previous public
sector measures to curtail
executive compensation.
The decidedly limited
success of these measures
suggests exploring private
sector reforms. Therefore,
the balance of the paper
discusses specific strategies
and means that can be—
and to some extent, have
been—utilized by the private
sector to reign in excessive
CEO compensation.
Untoward Consequences
Runaway CEO pay can
have decidedly negative
socio-economic ramifica-
tions. These include
1. Adverse impact on
corporate net income
and shareholder value.
Runaway CEO compen-
sation, particularly when
corporate performance is
poor, frequently harms
shareholders and saps
investor confidence. The
enormous amount of
money involved in
excessive CEO pay
constitutes a significant
economic loss to
shareholders, and has
macroeconomic conse-
quences. CEO pay
reduces corporate net
income which, in turn,
both lowers the funds
available for dividends to
shareholders and
decreases the value of
their stock. In 1993, the
aggregate compensation
paid to the top five
executives of U.S. public
companies represented
5 percent of company
profits; by 2003 the ratio
had doubled to 10%. The
total amount paid to
these executives during
this period was roughly
$350 billion (Bebchuk &
Grinstein, 2005). 
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2. Adverse impact on
employees. Already
noted has been the
dramatic increase in the
ratio of average CEO pay
to average worker pay.
Compounding this is the
celerity with which this
ratio is growing.
Adjusted for inflation,
average worker pay rose
8% from 1995 to 2005,
whereas median CEO
pay at the 350 largest
firms rose about 150%
in the same period
(Congressional Research
Service, 2007). When
such sharply increasing
CEO pay becomes the
handmaiden of relatively
minimal average worker
gains, that can nega-
tively impact employee
morale and productivity.
Employee resentment is
particularly aroused
when rank and file
workers—but not
executives—feel the
pinch of poor corporate
performance. Affected
employees may become
cynical and even resort
to unethical behavior
(Anderson & Bateman,
1997).
3. Corrupting incentive. A
popular form of CEO
compensation, the stock
option, creates an
incentive to cook the
books or take other
actions that boost short-
term stock price at the
expense of long-term 
corporate growth and
value. The size and
triggers in many CEO
pay packages motivate
executives to manipulate
earnings, backdate
options or engage in
unprofitable mergers
and acquisitions—
activities that ultimately
undermine shareholder
value and market
confidence. As former
Securities and Exchange
Commission (hereafter,
SEC) Chair Arthur
Levitt, Jr., put it, “these
compensation packages
set up a system in which
executives have I believe
the wrong incentives.
Too often they are
managing the numbers
for short-term gain and
personal payout”
(Symposium on
Bebchuk and Fried’s Pay
Without Performance
2005). 
Previous Government
Efforts to Corral Runaway
CEO Pay
Three prior forays by
government attempting to
check the growth of
executive compensation
were enacted. Yet all failed
to achieve their goals. In
1984, Congress imposed a
penalty tax on executives
whose golden parachute
equaled or exceeded three
times the executive’s base
pay (IRC Code section
4999), and denied the
paying corporation a tax
deduction for the excess
[IRC Code section 280G(a)].
In response, many
companies simply paid this
penalty for their executives,
a benefit called “grossing
up.” Moreover, “three times
the base pay” became a
popular standard for many
golden parachutes that was
higher than its predeces-
sors, therewith exacerbating
the problem it was intended
to alleviate. In 1993,
Congress responded to
outrage over executive pay
levels by imposing a $1
million cap on the tax
deductibility of compensa-
tion to CEOs and the next
four highest-paid employees
in a company [IRC Code
section 62(m)]. No
compensation above the cap
was allowed a deduction
unless it was “performance-
based.” Included in this
protected exclusion category
was stock options. This
provision is widely believed
to have contributed to the
explosion of stock option
compensation beginning in
the mid-1990s (Cox, 2006).
Consequently, overall
compensation grew even
more quickly than before,
aggravating—rather than
mitigating—the excessive
pay problem, and may have
led to cognate problems,
such as widespread stock
option backdating.
Legislated regulatory
reform in 2006 also sought
to address the executive pay
problem, albeit in a
somewhat oblique way. New
SEC regulations mandated
more extensive and uniform
disclosure of executive
compensation. The hope
was that greater trans-
parency would have a
chastening effect on the
largesse of corporate boards
towards top management.
Alas, transparency-seeking
regulations, per se, were
inadequate: reporting
compliance has been spotty,
enforcement lax
(Morgenson, 2008a), and it
appears doubtful that
disclosure alone will
significantly inhibit
excessive CEO pay. Indeed,
the new disclosure
constraint is, perversely,
more likely to spur creative
dissemblance in corporate
4 Summer 2010 Southern Business Review
reporting. Further, notes
one observer, “[C]learer data
may give CEOs a basis to
insist on higher pay, putting
ever greater pressure on
compensation committees”
(Lorsch, 2006). Put
differently, sunshine may
not always be the best
disinfectant—contrary to the
popular maxim.
Reform Proposals
In sum, the current
mechanisms for containing
excessive CEO compensa-
tion are demonstrably
ineffective. New methods are
needed. Reforms can
emanate from the public
and/or private sectors. As
discussed, past experience
suggests guarded optimism
as to the efficacy of
government measures as
remedies of first choice.
Rather, reform efforts
should ideally initiate from
within the corporation and
the private sector in general.
Endogenous reforms have
two key advantages: they
are closer to the source of
the problem, and they are
voluntary. To the extent that
these reforms are
unavailing, recourse can be
had to governmental
authorizations that
additionally empower
corporate actors—boards
and shareholders—rather
than require direct
government action.
Within the private
sector, corporate boards are
the gatekeepers of executive
compensation. When
corporate governance
breaks down and corporate
boards award unreasonably
high CEO pay packages, the
locus of reform moves to the
shareholders. Among them,
institutional shareholders
are in the best position to
sponsor remedial initiatives,
as they have the most
leverage. The reform
proposals that follow are
grouped into Board of
Director Actions and
Shareholder Actions. They
are variously sourced and
reflect distinctive
approaches. Some are
mandatory; others are
merely hortatory. Some are
outright bans; others
require only additional
disclosure.
Board of Directors Actions
Business Week called
astronomical executive pay
“the most egregious
governance failure of the
20th century” (Lavelle, 2002,
p. 108). The compelling
questions are why corporate
boards consent to such
outsized pay, and what, if
anything, can be done to
change that behavior. Under
the corporate governance
model, directors are elected
by the shareholders to act
as fiduciaries for the benefit
of the corporation and its
shareholders, primarily by
overseeing management. In
this capacity, the board—
presumably engaging in
arm’s-length transactions—
negotiates the pay packages
of present or sought-after
CEOs. But it is here that
fact and theory diverge. In a
thorough corruption of
intention, many boards of
directors are selected de
facto by the top
management they
presumably monitor (Berle,
A and Gardner, C., 1968). A
board hand-picked by top
management is unlikely to
perform its oversight
function with independence
and dispassion. This gross
distortion of intent is
effectuated by top
management’s control of the
proxy process. In board of
director elections, almost all
shareholders vote by proxy.
Yet proxy voters are
typically given no alternative
to the slate of candidates
proposed by management.
The allegiance of directors
so “elected” to their
management sponsors
creates a conflict of interest
that is at once the nub of
the current outrage over
CEO pay and the impetus
for reform.
Various non-
governmental stimuli can
prompt boards to act
responsibly on CEO pay.
They may respond out of an
abstract sense of propriety,
or because they believe that
to do so is in furtherance of
their fiduciary responsibility
to the shareholders.
Alternatively, they may react
to the informal urgings from
shareholders, or from
external groups such as the
financial media or creditors.
Boards must respond to
passed shareholder
resolutions, but that is
predicated on allowing the
resolution to come up for a
vote, a prerequisite that
resistant boards are usually
able to block. 
In the proposals that
follow, corporate boards can
employ four discrete types of
actions that address the
CEO pay issue. The first
(proposals 1-2) mandates
changes in the composition
of the board of directors.
The second (proposals 3-8)
establishes options and
guidelines for boards of
directors to use in
negotiating and setting the
terms of CEO pay. The third
Southern Business Review Summer 2010 5
(proposal 9) prescribes
disclosure that would
indirectly but substantially
have a dampening effect on
CEO pay. The fourth
(proposal 10) creates an
additional obligation of the
committee members serving
on the all-important
Compensation Committee of
the board of directors. 
Mandate different
people for CEO and chair
of the board of directors.
Combining the roles of CEO
and Chair of the board of
directors has become
increasingly common at
large corporations (Garten,
2002), probably because it
facilitates implementation of
the CEO’s policies and
strategies unfettered by
contrary views of other
directors. By the same
token, aggregating all that
power in one individual
emasculates the board of
directors, hampering its
ability to independently
monitor management and
effectively implement
corporate governance.
Further, combining the two
key corporate roles
necessarily presents a
situation rife with conflicts
of interest. How can a CEO
be his/her own boss? With
regard to CEO
compensation, a board
chaired by its corporation’s
CEO is unlikely to have the
desired independence when
setting that CEO’s pay.
(Nothing confounds a
gatekeeper group’s mission
more than when the chief
gatekeeper is also the most
potent threat to crash the
gate.) Separating the two
roles would add
independence to the board
of directors, and improve
corporate governance.
Preclude CEOs of other
companies from serving
on the board of directors.
Richard Finlay, founder of
the Center for Corporate &
Public Governance, observes
that CEO pay isn’t set by
markets. Instead, it is
“determined by a small
clique of like-minded
directors, most of whom are
themselves past and current
CEOs with a vested interest
in perpetuating a failed, but
to them, remarkably
generous, system”
(Associated Press, 6/11/07).
The rules of the NYSE (New
York Stock Exchange, 2008)
and NASDAQ (2006) require
a majority of the board of
directors of a listed
company to be “outside
directors,” i.e., independent.
That means they cannot be
officers or have other
significant financial ties to
the company on whose
board they sit. Yet CEOs
still have undeniable power
to hand-pick their board
directors. In so doing, they
will often seek CEOs of
other companies to serve on
their boards. These CEOs
qua directors often favor
high CEO pay in the hope or
expectation of reciprocation.
Ample potential for personal
gain inheres in this
“interlocking director”
situation. To illustrate,
assume Smith, a director of
Corporation A, is an officer
of Corporation B, on whose
board sits Jones, the CEO of
Corporation A. Smith’s
compensation as an officer
at Corporation B can be
directly affected by Jones in
his capacity as a director of
B. 
Surveying the literature
on interlocking directorates,
Hermalin and Weisbach
(2003) concluded that
“CEOs with interlocking
boards get paid more than
otherwise similar CEOs,”
and “interlocking
directorships provide the
CEO a degree of control over
his board” that harms
performance (p.18).
Similarly, another literature
review (Mizruchi, 1996)
found that corporate boards
with high proportions of
interlocking directorates
were more likely to award
lucrative golden parachute
packages for its top
management, and more
likely to adopt “poison pill”
defenses to attempted
hostile takeovers—another
benefit to top management.
Consequently,  the efforts of
boards seeking greater
independence from their
CEOs by increasing their
percentages of outside
directors may eventuate in
greater CEO control if
enough of those outside
directors are also CEOs of
other companies—an
outcome exquisite in its
irony. 
Require that
compensation be tied to
company performance vis-
à-vis peer companies. “Pay
for performance” has
become the mantra of
corporate governance
advocates as regards
appropriate CEO
compensation. The term
references an inter-
dependence between the
company’s earnings and the
CEO’s compensation. By
itself, however, it is an
inadequate, gross
measurement of a CEO’s
effectiveness. All other
factors being equal, if a
company is doing no better
than its industry’s average,
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then all that was necessary
was for it to mimic its
competitors. That does not
require great management
skills or foresight. In its new
executive compensation
disclosure rules, the SEC
considered, but did not
adopt, the proposal to
require disclosure of this
peer company comparison. 
Defenders of CEO pay
point to the heavy use of
stock option compensation
as evidence that CEO
compensation is tied to
company performance. With
stock options, CEO compen-
sation increases in direct
proportion to the rise of the
corporation’s stock price.
The flaw in this argument is
that options are usually
designed to reward
absolute, not relative,
performance. In the bull
market of the 1990s,
virtually all stock prices
were rising. That meant that
a company could under-
perform its competitors, and
the CEO and other
executives awarded options
would still reap handsome
rewards. Moreover, the
awarding of options in the
first place may have been
totally unrelated to
performance measures
(Douglas, 2008). 
Peer-company per-
formance was what the
Hewlett-Packard board of
directors looked at in 2005
when it removed its CEO,
Carly Fiorina, after the
company consistently
underperformed its
competitors, Dell and IBM.
As a result, the directors
were viewed as having acted
when needed (Wallman,
2005). This standard was
also integrated by CalPERS,
the nation’s largest pension
fund, in the 2008 settlement
of its class action against
United Health Group
(Lifsher, 2008). Under the
agreement, executive
compensation was tied to
the company’s performance
compared with industry
peers.
Insert clawback
provisions in compensa-
tion contracts. These
provisions require the
executive to repay certain
compensation to the
corporation upon the
happening of a specified
adverse event, such as a
downward restatement of
earnings (whether or not the
executive was responsible
for the financial
misstatement that led to the
required restatement), or
the involvement of the
executive in financial
misconduct. Recoverable
compensation includes
bonuses and gains on stock
options and restricted stock
grants. A study by the
Corporate Library reported
in the New York Times
found that 14 percent of the
over 2,000 companies
surveyed had clawback
provisions (Morgenson,
2008b). In 2005, a clawback
provision was also provided
for in H.R.4291 (109th
Congress), the Protection
Against Executive
Compensation Abuse Act,
discussed below. 
Limit stock options in
favor of restricted stock
that precludes the CEO’s
ability to unload quickly.
Heavy reliance on stock
option compensation of top
executives can foster
undesirable behavior. For
example, it incentivizes
executives to engage in
backdating of stock options
and corporate earnings
manipulation via accounting
fraud and other schemes
designed to drive up stock
prices—at least in the short
run. In response, many
firms are replacing
conventional options with
restricted stock (Lublin,
2003). The benefit of
restricted stock is that it
can defer availability of the
stock for a prescribed
“holding period.” That would
impede the current ability of
executives to quickly unload
their stock. As a result,
executives would no longer
be able to benefit from
increases in short-term
stock prices (Bebchuk &
Kurana, 2006). The longer
the holding period, the
greater the executive’s
motivation to focus on long-
term share value.
Contractually
authorize greater board
flexibility in adjusting
CEO compensation. In
general, companies should
eschew contractually
locking themselves into
various forms of
compensation that will have
to be paid even when
corporate performance
sinks. Employment
contracts with new CEOs
often do not leave the board
of directors adequate
flexibility to adjust
compensation in response to
changing conditions,
including poor performance.
Instead, targets and other
expectations could be
clearly stated, along with
the right to make
commensurate “downside
protection” adjustments to
compensation. At the least,
boards should reserve the
right to renegotiate.
Companies should be able
to adjust bonuses based on
Southern Business Review Summer 2010 7
the quality of earnings. For
example, you should not be
able to “earn” your
earnings-per-share goal
bonus by buying back
stock.
 The new SEC rules on
executive compensation
disclosure will expose many
forms of “stealth
compensation,” including
perks like golf
memberships, use of the
company jet and above-
market interest rates on
special deferred
compensation packages for
top executives. If they are
not locked-in by contract,
the company could cap or
renegotiate these too when
corporate performance
drops. 
Gauge CEO pay in
relation to what is earned
by other top management
in the same company. 
Former DuPont  CEO Ed
Woolard has suggested that
it would be helpful in con-
trolling CEO pay to assess it
in relation to what the next
echelon of management
within the company is being
paid (Lorsch, 2006). Along
with considering the
percentage of corporate net
profit that the CEO takes (at
the expense of the
shareholders), determining
CEO pay as a percentage of
total top management
compensation would place a
focus on internal equity. As
noted above, the
conventional gauge is what
other CEOs are earning, as
determined from a survey
conducted by a compensa-
tion consultant. These
surveys, however, may be
faulty or use data from non-
peer companies. In contrast,
the internal management
compensation data will be
verifiable and contain a
company-specific frame of
reference that, at the least,
could usefully supplement
the information from
consultant surveys. More-
over, it would not require
the services of a compensa-
tion consultant.
Limit or eliminate the
use of competition surveys
by compensation con-
sultants in determining
CEO compensation. A
common practice of
compensation consultants
hired to recommend a CEO
compensation package is to
conduct a survey of CEO
pay in competitor or similar
companies, but without
regard to company perform-
ance. Because no board
compensation committee
wants to admit that its
CEO’s ability or pay is below
the median—the “Lake
Wobegon effect”—most
committees will want to offer
more than the median,
thereby placing upward
pressure on the offered
compensation. This process
continually drives up the
overall CEO pay averages.
Competition surveys have
become excessive and
subject to abuse, and,
because they do not reflect
the performances of the
companies surveyed, they
are flawed. 
Require disclosure of
all additional income paid
to firms affiliated with the
corporation’s compensa-
tion consultants.
Compensation consultants
are often part of larger firms
that furnish additional
consulting services (Con-
gressional Research Service,
2007). This can create an
inherent conflict of interests
because the fees earned by
consultants for compensa-
tion work are often far less
than what they make from
other business with the
same company (Morgenson,
2008b). Thus a company’s
compensation consulting
firm, seeking to win new
and more lucrative
contracts to oversee the
same company’s benefits or
pension plans, may be loath
to alienate the company’s
CEO by recom-mending
anything but a generous pay
package (Creswell, 2007).
One observer describes the
resulting conflict of
interests: 
The theoretical role
of the compensation
consultant is to
make an inde-
pendent assessment
of what senior
executives are
supposed to be paid, 
but
[t]he business model
of being a compensa-
tion consultant is
based on satisfying
the interests of the
people about whom
they’re supposed to
be making that
independent
judgment (Sympo-
sium on Bebchuk
and Fried’s Pay
Without Perform-
ance, 2005: 775).
Curiously, the SEC did
not require this disclosure
when it rewrote the rules on
executive compensation
disclosure. Under current
rules, companies only have
to identify their consultants,
not what they pay them. In
Congressional hearings held
during December, 2007, the
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House Committee on Over-
sight and Government
Reform found that about
half of the nation’s 250
largest companies are
conflicted because they paid
the same firm to provide
both compensation
consulting and other
services in 2006. Of these,
over two-thirds did not
disclose the conflicts or,
worse, informed the
shareholders that the
conflicted consultants were
“independent” (U.S. House
of Representatives, 2007).
Data from the related
Congressional report
supports the view that this
conflict of interests is
inimical to the interests of
the shareholders. The report
found that in 2006 the
median CEO salary of the
Fortune 250 companies that
hired compensation
consultants with the largest
conflict of interests was 67
percent higher than the
median CEO salary of the
companies that did not use
conflicted consultants. Over
the period between 2002
and 2006, that same group
of companies using
conflicted consultants
increased CEO pay over
twice as fast as the
companies that did not use
conflicted consultants (U.S.
House of Representatives
Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, 2007). 
Require members of
the board of directors
compensation committee
to hold large blocks of
company shares. Post-
Enron concern with the
untoward influence of top
executives over their
compensation committees
led all of the major stock
exchanges to require that
listed companies have
compensation committees
composed entirely of
independent directors. But
independence does not
guarantee sensitivity to CEO
compensation issues. More
effective would be a require-
ment that compensation
committee members “have
more skin in the game,” i.e.,
own a significant number of
corporate shares, for that
will cause them to
personally bear more of the
costs associated with
excessive CEO pay.
Research evidence indicates
that when compensation
committee members hold a
large amount of their
corporation’s stock they are
more involved in company
affairs, CEO pay is lower,
and the sensitivity of CEO
pay to firm performance is
higher (Cyert, Kang, &
Kumar, 2002). 
Shareholder Actions
Shareholders, too, can
effect change by
constraining the options of
corporate boards related to
setting CEO pay. Most
shareholder actions would
check board power, and are
therefore unlikely to be
initiated by boards of their
own volition. The proposed
actions are of three types.
The first (proposal 1)
requires the board of
directors to give share-
holders a direct say—
binding or advisory—on
executive pay packages
before they can be
approved. The second
(proposals 2-3) empowers
shareholders in the
nominations of, and voting
for, directors. Because they
substantially constrict the
prevailing prerogatives of
boards of directors and top
management in favor of
shareholders, these two
types of actions will
require—at least initially—
governmental mandate to
have widespread applica-
tion. Albeit derivative
powers, they are
nonetheless preferable to
direct government
regulation, such as tax code
sanctions, which has proven
nugatory. Comprising the
third type (proposals 4-6)
are strategies that
shareholders can employ via
shareholder resolutions or
informal pressure.
Give shareholders a
more specific say on CEO
compensation. Share-
holders could influence CEO
compensation by a rule
requiring boards to get
advisory (non-binding)
shareholder approval of
proposed executive
compensation packages.
NYSE (2008) and NASDAQ
(2006) listing standards
already require a
shareholder vote on all
“equity-compensation plans
and material revisions
thereto.” But this approval
pertains to plans as a whole,
not to specific option or
stock awards to particular
employees, and does not
apply at all to other, suspect
non-equity forms of
compensation, such as
severance benefits. The
United States could adopt
the British model which
does require shareholder
approval of individual
compensation packages.
Even though these
shareholder approval votes
are merely advisory, their
effect tends to be
consequential. The result of
such votes, writes Morgen-
son, 
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has been more
detailed disclosures
from companies in
their annual reports,
not only on pay
levels but also on
how the
compensation is
structured and the
rationale behind it.
And when
shareholders vote
against a pay
structure, companies
get the message and
change their ways
(2006, p. 1).
Proposed “Say on Pay”
legislation offered in both
houses of Congress would
require such approval. 
None of these bills cap or
limit CEO pay; they merely
require that firms discuss
and debate pay packages for
CEOs on a case-by-case
basis with their share-
holders. If a board of
directors disagrees with the
nonbinding vote of
shareholders, the board can
still go forward with the pay
package. At the very least,
however, shareholders
would have had the
opportunity to voice their
opinions about whether the
pay package is appropriate. 
Other bills have targeted the
notoriously bloated golden
parachutes severance
packages commonly found
in CEO contracts. Many are
triggered by “change-of-
control” provisions. These
allow a CEO to leave and
take his severance package
when there has been a
merger or other change of
control of the corporation.
Eligibility for lucrative
severance benefits after a
change of control event can
encourage a CEO to leave
rather than work with a new
(and perhaps reform-
minded) block of
shareholders. 
The Protection Against
Executive Compensation
Abuse Act (HR 4291,
proposed in the 109th
Congress) required the
separate disclosure to and
approval of shareholders for
all golden parachute
severance packages. This, in
fact, was the shareholder
proposal made by CalPERS
in 2006 with regards to
executive severance
agreements at The Shaw
Group corporation. The
proposal provided that the
board of directors obtain
shareholder ratification of
any executive severance
agreement that provided
benefits with a total present
value that was at least three
times the sum of the
executive’s base salary plus
target bonus. Covered
benefits included
perquisites, consulting fees,
equity awards and pension
benefit enhancements
(Proxy Governance News
Release, 2007).
Allow shareholder
nominations to the board
of directors. In theory, one
of the best ways to reign in
runaway CEO compensation
and facilitate effective
corporate governance is by
limiting management’s
control over the composition
of the board of directors in
favor of greater shareholder
influence. A means to this
end would allow
shareholders to directly
nominate candidates for the
board of directors and have
these nominees appear on
the company’s proxy
materials sent to
shareholders. In order to be
workable, nominations
would be limited to
shareholders owning a
specified minimum
percentage (e.g., 5%) of the
company’s voting stock.
Although this caveat would
eliminate the vast majority
of shareholders, at least
institutional and other
shareholders who act as
watchdogs would have
independent candidates. 
Permitting shareholder
nominations to corporate
boards has been a long-
standing rallying cry of
corporate watchdogs and
others in the “corporate
democracy” movement.
Thus far, the SEC has
rejected this proposal. It
may revisit the issue. If it
does not, Barney Frank,
Chair of the House
Financial Services
Committee, has suggested
that Congress might
intervene (Brush, 2006). 
Institute majority
voting for boards of
directors. Those advocating
corporate democracy also
favor majority voting in
director elections. If we
conceive of runaway CEO
pay as a problem sourced in
the “capture” of boards by
top management (to the
detriment of the
shareholders), then a key
reform objective is to
pressure boards to be more
responsive to shareholders.
To that end the movement
for majority voting in board
of directors elections has
been directed. The pro-
cedural norm in director
elections has been that
shareholders receive in their
proxy materials a slate of
directors nominated by
management. Shareholders
can either vote “yes” or
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withhold their vote. Absent
a “no” option, one “yes” vote
suffices to elect. In contrast,
majority voting requires that
director nominees must get
more “yes” votes than
“withholds.” A growing
number of institutional
shareholders have backed
the majority voting reform
(Kirkland and Burke, 2006). 
Limit or eliminate
staggered boards.
Staggered boards are those
where only a fraction (often
one-third) of the board
membership comes up for
election each year.
Originally conceived as a
countermeasure to
cumulative shareholder
voting (a common statutory
rule designed to provide
proportional voting power to
minority shareholders in
director elections), staggered
boards insulate a majority of
the board from proxy
contests every year. Instead,
they require dissatisfied
shareholders to prevail in
two consecutive elections to
replace a majority of the
incumbents. This seriously
dilutes shareholder power to
sanction or remove directors
who authorize runaway
CEO pay. Yet a majority of
public companies now have
staggered boards (Bebchuk
& Fried, 2004). Share-
holders can propose
resolutions limiting or
eliminating the staggered
board on a company-by-
company basis. 
Encourage shareholder
opposition to “Poison Pill”
defenses. A poison pill is an
anti-takeover device. It
effectively gives a board of
directors veto power over
any bid for the company, no
matter how beneficial to the
shareholders, by making it
prohibitively expensive.
Consequently, the poison
pill impairs the
shareholder’s right to sell
his shares directly to
whomever he chooses;
instead, he can only sell to
those pre-approved by the
board of directors. In this
fashion, the pill can and has
been used to entrench a
board and management
responsible for excessive
CEO pay.
Shareholders have two
basic ways to challenge
poison pills. They can offer
resolutions to restrict the
use of extant poison pill
defenses. They can also
require a shareholder
approval before the poison
pill is employed.
Urge mutual funds to
block excessive CEO pay
packages. In the private
sector, no one has more
potential influence over
CEO compensation than the
large institutional
shareholders. It is therefore
puzzling that a study by the
American Federation of
State, County, and
Municipal Employees (2006)
found that one of the largest
institutional shareholders,
mutual funds, often side
with corporate management
on executive pay issues—in
contravention of the
interests of the mutual
funds’ own shareholders.
The study, "Enablers of
Excess: Mutual Funds and
the Overpaid American
CEO," analyzed the proxy
votes cast by 18 of the 25
largest mutual funds at
1,642 meetings between
July 2004 to June 2005. It
found that they voted for the
board of directors’
compensation proposals
75.6 percent of the time—
almost three times as often
as for shareholder
proposals, most of which
called for reforming CEO
pay policies.  The study
concluded that “Mutual
fund companies are a prime
enabler of excessive CEO
pay” (American Federation,
2006)).
Speculating as to
reasons why mutual funds
do not use their consider-
able voting power to put the
brakes on CEO pay, one
explanation stems from a
conflict of interests: mutual
funds often seek the money
management business of
companies whose stock they
own and would therefore be
reluctant to oppose
management. Another
possible explanation is that
avoiding companies with
excessive CEO compensa-
tion would result in too
much of a restriction on
portfolio management.
Notwithstanding the bona
fides of these explanations,
fund companies are
supposed to serve as
fiduciaries acting in the best
interests of their
shareholders. If a fund’s
managers believe that a
CEO’s pay at a corporation
whose stock is held by the
fund was unjustifiably high,
they have every right to
register their dissent on
behalf of those share-
holders. If the board of
directors is not responsive,
the fund managers could
move their money to funds
more attuned to shareholder
interests.
Conclusion
Breathtakingly
extravagant CEO
compensation packages
continue to arouse heated
and extensive public
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disapprobation. When such
CEO pay or severance pay-
outs come amidst the
financial decline or even
demise of the corporation
awarding them, the
resultant hue and cry for
corrective actions from
shareholders and others is
especially vivid. Although
several of our most
prominent political figures
have taken up the cudgel for
reform, prior government
efforts to curtail CEO pay
have been unavailing.
Given this impetus, we
can benefit by first
scrutinizing the wide variety
of options within the private
sector with which to address
the problem. Reform
proposals involve actions by
corporate boards, who
award the controversial pay
packages, and/or by share-
holders, whose financial
interests are most directly
affected by runaway CEO
pay. Appreciating the
breadth and potential
impact of reform vehicles
can help make the ultimate
choice(s) of action informed,
eclectic, equitable and,
hopefully, effective.
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